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Abstract
A political miracle occurred when Germany was reunited, and at first
glance an economic  miracle has  followed. Real incomes in the east have
now reached the western level, and  investment per capita has been much
higher than in the west. However, every third deutschmark spent in the
east has been coming from the west, investment in equipment has fallen
below the west German per capita level, and convergence seems to have
come to a halt at an overall labor productivity of only 55% of west
Germany. Excessively high wages coupled with investment incentives that
made the cost of capital negative rank high among the possible
explanations. This paper describes reforms of the labor market that could
help to make convergence continue.







1. A political miracle occurred ...
Even the day the wall came down, there were very few people in Germany who believed in
rapid unification. Today, ten years after that event, the political unification of Germany is
history. It went surprisingly smoothly, without riots and bloodshed. Only a handful of neo-
Nazis have disturbed the picture, but even they have become  less vocal.
German unification was a political miracle since it was hard to imagine that the
military forces of the Soviet Union would ever retreat peacefully from their occupied
territories. However, the courage of Michael Gorbachev, the loyalty of George Bush and the
cleverness of Helmut Kohl made the unthinkable true. With incredible speed, the two parts of
Germany were again unified after 45 years of separation. Given the political instability of the
Soviet Union at that time, it is hard to imagine better policy decisions by the Western leaders
than those which had actually been taken.
In relation to the political achievements, the economic aspects of unification seemed of
secondary importance to many. Helmut Kohl, a historian by education, predicted “flourishing
landscapes in three, four, five years,” and he thought that the budgetary costs of unification
would be small enough to be financed from the “petty cash”. Today we know that things were
not that easy and that the economic unification turned out to be much more difficult than
political unification. This paper reports on the state of economic integration in Germany and
tries to draw some conclusions for the future course of unification policy.
2. ... and at first glance an economic miracle has followed ....
In an important sense Helmut Kohl was right. Today there are flourishing landscapes in east
Germany. A gigantic building boom has led to a marvelous renovation of east German cities.
Less destroyed by British bombers than the western cities, many east German cities have been3
restored to their pre-war glamour. Spectacular facades, golden ledges, expensive shops and
luxurious pedestrian areas define the urban life in the post-communist era. Many of the
eastern city centers now outshine the cheap charm of the sixties that characterizes the cities of
west Germany.
The infrastructure, too, has been quickly renovated. Nearly all streets have been newly
paved, the electricity, fresh water and sewage systems have been overhauled, many new
autobahns have been built, and the airports and railway stations have been renovated and
converted into lively shopping centers. Fast ICE trains now connect the cities, and the fiber
optic telecommunications network is one of the best in the world. Most importantly, the well-
functioning legal system of west Germany was implemented in east Germany right from the
beginning. This has been a major advantage over the other eastern countries, which are still
undergoing a cumbersome process of gradually adjusting their legal systems to the
requirements of a market economy.
Living standards, which had been extremely poor in communist times, have nearly
reached those in the west. The micro data analyzed by the Ifo Institute show that east German
households’ average net-of-tax incomes have surpassed 80% of the western level. Given the
somewhat lower price level in the east, which primarily results from the low housing costs,
this implies an average real household income of at least 90% of the west.
1 Figure 1 depicts
the time path of nominal household incomes relative to the west German level since the year
1990.
                                                
1 The data refer to typical households and may suffer from a selection bias insofar as richer households which
tend to concentrate in the west are not included in the sample. They also neglect wealth income which is
indeed negligible with the typical west and east German household, but, once again, not with richer
households not included in the sample. See Paqué (1999).4
Figure 1: Average nominal and real net-of-tax household incomes in east Germany
relative to west Germany
Source: Ifo Wirtschaftskonjunktur No. 7, 1999, p. A18.
Note: a) Spring 1990, before currency union, evaluated at an exchange rate of 1:1.  b) July 1990, shortly after
currency union.
Not all of these incomes are active ones. They include pensions, social aid and
unemployment insurance benefits. The separate level of relative pensions is also shown in the
figure. Remarkably, in east Germany household pension income is higher than in west
Germany, since the labor force participation of women is higher and since an overly favorable
formula for the translation of GDR claims into the western pension system was chosen. In
1998, on average, household pensions in the east are 111% of those in the west in nominal
terms and about 120% in real terms.
2
  The high living standard in the east does have a correspondence in the real economy
which has been modernized very rapidly. The general approach has been to close down the
existing manufacturing firms and to open new ones next door, the General Motors plant in
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manufacturing sector by 80% and a dramatic productivity boost. According to Barrell and te
Velde (1999), in the period from 1990 through 1997 real labor productivity in east Germany
increased by nearly 80%, while real labor productivity in Poland, Ireland and Hungary
increased only by about 30%.
The development was paralleled, if not induced, by a remarkable investment boom
that exceeded all expectations. While the share of investment in GDP in west Germany was
about 20% in the last decade, it was way above 40% in east Germany, with peak levels close
to 50% in the years 1992 through 1995. It may be argued that these figures are so high
because east German GDP has been so low. However, even in per capita terms it exceeded the
west German level by up to 52%. Figure 2 demonstrates the time path of east German per
capita investment relative to the respective west German level. The figure shows that the
relative investment volume in east Germany has declined recently, but it still is at a level of
more than 130%.
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Source: Ifo investment database; see Müller (2000).
Note: Aggregate investment per head of working population (15–65 years of age).
                                                                                                                                                        
2  See Nierhaus (1999).6
3. ... however, vast resources have been coming from the west Germany.....
The development of the east German living conditions is remarkable. The problem is,
however, that the abundance of resources available to the east Germans does not fully result
from east German production. As figure 3 shows, aggregate absorption -- the resource use by
private households, investors and the government -- has been much larger than east German
GDP since the time of unification, indicating a large current account deficit. In 1998, east
German GDP was 436 billion deutschmarks, but absorption was 655 billion deutschmarks,
which is 220 billion deutschmarks or 50% more. In other words, every third deutschmark
spent in east Germany came from the west.
Figure 3: Excess absorption in east Germany
Sources: German Statistical Office, Ministry of Economics, German Institute of Economic Research, German
National Bank.
Note: The official absorption statistics are available only until 1994. In the subsequent years, absorption has been
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As the figure shows, nearly two thirds of the current account deficit of east Germany is
financed by public transfers, and one third by private capital flows. More than 50% of the
transfers, in turn, are for social security and only 12% are infrastructure expenses. The
remainder includes intergovernmental grants of various kinds, in particular the payments of
the fiscal equalization fund ( Länderfinanzausgleich) and the federal supplemental grant
(Bundesergänzungsabgabe). The private capital flows include direct investment in plant and
equipment, business loans and public loans. The latter is noteworthy insofar as it shows that it
would be wrong to interpret the private capital flows as resulting exclusively from the superb
investment opportunities in the east. Public borrowing is part of the explanation of these
flows.
This points to another problem of the new  Länder: the enormous increase in public
debt. In 1998, public per capita expenditure in the new Länder was 19% more than in the old
ones, but per capita tax revenue was 26% less. The difference was partly financed by the
public transfers reported in figure 3 and partly by funds the new  Länder borrowed in the
capital market. In 1998, up to 33 billion deutschmarks of the estimated 78 billion
deutschmarks capital inflow may simply have resulted from an increase in east German public
debt.
3 As was recently shown by Seitz (1999), by 1998 per capita debt of the east German
communities and Länder had surpassed the respective figure for the west German  Länder,
although they had started with practically no public debt in 1990.
4
The size of the current account deficit is an unresolved problem for German
unification since it indicates that the east German economy is far from being self-sustaining.
To get a feeling for the size of the problem figure 4 compares the current account deficit
shares in GDP of various other countries, including those which rank highest in a worldwide
                                                
3  The figure measures the net increase in east German public debt; see Seitz (1999, p. 33), who found for 1998
an external financing ratio of 42 % concerning total investment in east Germany.8
comparison. It is alarming to see that even fragile economies like Mexico, Poland, Portugal or
Hungary have deficit shares that are only one tenth of the east German figure.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































The east German deficit figure reminds us more of other countries’ import shares in
GDP than their deficit shares. For a country the size of east Germany an import share of 50%
would not be implausible. Countries like Belgium, Austria or the Netherlands have import
shares of between 45% and 70%. However, unlike east Germany, there the import shares are
backed by equivalent export shares. This, indeed, is the east German problem. The sector of
non-traded goods operates as well as in other countries, and there is no shortage of imported
                                                                                                                                                        
4  The figures refer to the territorial states; the three city states Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin are excluded. The
public debt does not include the debt of the communal building societies which was inherited from the GDR.9
goods and services. To the visitor the visible way of life does not differ much from the west.
Given that there is enough money around, construction, retailing, restaurants, cultural
activities, banking and outward tourism all work very well. The only problem is that a basis in
terms of goods and services sold to the rest of the world is missing. In east Germany, the
money that other countries earn abroad comes as gifts and loans from the west. Except for this
peculiarity, everything else is more or less equal.
The manufacturing sector of the GDR had been reasonably successful before
unification. At an exchange rate that drove the wage cost to only 7% of the west German one,
the GDR had been able to maintain an export share of roughly 40% of its GDP, and about half
of the exports went to the west. In the first two years after unification output in the
manufacturing sector fell by more than 60% and since then it has only gradually recovered.
As of today (1999), employment in the manufacturing sector has remained at a level of only
one fourth of what it used to be in the GDR. It is true that output in that sector steadily rose
between 1991 and 1998 at an impressive annual rate of 4.7%, however that growth rate relates
to the very low level to which output had fallen after the breakdown of communism. It is
unclear whether, as of 1999, the deutschmark value of east German exports to the western
regions and countries had already surpassed the GDR level, but no statistics are known to the
author that could be used to clarify this issue.
It is debatable how dangerous the situation depicted in figure 4 really is. A five percent
current account deficit in Poland may be more problematic than a 50% current account deficit
in east Germany. After all, the west German economy is strong enough to cover the necessary
expenses for the east, and Germany as a whole has a balanced current account with the rest of
the world despite the internal excess absorption.
5 As long as the west Germans tolerate the
resource transfer, there is no real danger involved. Nevertheless, the public transfer is 4.5% of
                                                
5 In 1989, the year before unification, Germany had a current account surplus of 107.1 bn deutschmarks, which
was the second largest in the world.10
west German GDP, and if east German public borrowing is added, the total public resource
transfer to east Germany is 5.6% of the west German GDP. This may seem a small number if
it manages to disappear in the foreseeable future, but less so should it continue forever.
4. ... and some economic indicators are more than alarming.
Unfortunately, at present there is not much reason for optimism, since the convergence
process seems to have come to a halt since 1996. There are various pieces of information
demonstrating this.
One is the fact that east German GDP is currently growing at a smaller rate than west
German GDP. Initially, from 1989 through 1991, east German GDP had shrunk by more than
40%, which was more than the collapse of the US economy in the great depression (about one
third). Thereafter, and from a new statistical base, the economy grew first at a rate of about
8% -- 9%. From 1997, however, growth staggered, with annual growth rates of only 1%
through 2%. It is true that both the east and the west German economies were in recession in
recent years. But the east German economy suffered much more and according to the most
recent Ifo business polls it will not participate equally in the strong boom foreseen for the year
2000. The joint forecast of Germany’s six economic research institutes published in autumn
1999 foresees for the year 2000 a growth rate of 2.7% in west Germany, but only one of 2.4%
in east Germany. Figure 5 illustrates the development of the growth rates of the two parts of
Germany since 1992.11
Figure 5: Real growth in east and west Germany
Sources: Association of statistical offices of German Länder, working group on regional accounts 1999, Ifo
Institute.
Note: GDP growth in 1991 prices, figures from data base of the statistical offices of the German Länder; 1999
and 2000 estimation and projection by Ifo.
Another piece of information is the level of equipment investment. Normally,
economic growth stems from the accumulation of capital. Capital is productive in itself and it
also carries technological knowledge. Thus, catching up with west Germany is not
conceivable without a long period during which the per capita investment in east Germany is
higher than in west Germany. As figure 2 showed, this condition indeed seems to have been
satisfied since unification despite the recent slowdown of the investment rate. However, the
impression may be deceptive.
Figure 6, which was calculated from the Ifo investment database,
6 breaks the
investment figure down to its components showing that the extra investment in the east has
concentrated on building investment rather than equipment. It is indeed the renovation of the













been up to 80% more than in the west. Investment in equipment, by contrast, performed
poorly. It was significantly above the west only in the three years 1994 through 1996, and
since 1998 it has dropped to only 90% with even lower values to be feared for 1999 and 2000.
This is truly alarming for the further convergence process, because it is equipment rather than
buildings which carries the technological progress and has a direct effect on labor productivity
and competitiveness. If per capita investment in equipment does not exceed that in the west, a
continued conversion process is hard to imagine.
Figure 6: East German per capita investment in building and equipment relative to the west
Source: German statistical office (1999),  Fachserie 18 (investment in construction),  Ifo’s database for
investments in Germany (investment in equipment); German statistical office (1999) Fachserie 1, Reihe 4.1.1
(working population); cf. Müller (2000).
Note: Investment per head of working population (15-65 years of age).
Indeed figure 7 demonstrates that the convergence of per capita output  seems to have
come to a halt. Dividing GDP by the number of people of working age and relating this to the
                                                                                                                                                        
6  The Ifo investment database is the only source providing data for west and east Germany separately; its data
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respective western figure produces a value of only 56%, and this value has persisted since
about 1995. No upward trend is in sight.
Figure 7: Convergence of per capita  output?
Sources: German Statistical Office (1999), Fachserie 18, Mikrozensus 1999
Note: GDP per head of working population (15–65 years of age).
5. There are alternative explanations for the halt to convergence ...
 If seen against the usual convergence models, the halt to convergence is more than surprising
because, normally, an asymptotic adjustment towards the same structural variables is
predicted when there is free migration of the relevant factors of production and a free
exchange of technological knowledge. There are at least four complementary explanations for
why the normal model predictions do not apply to east Germany, and they may all be true.
Figure 7 demonstrates the halt to convergence in terms of  per capita output. Per capita
output is the product of the participation rate and the output per employee.  The explanations
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i) Termination of the investment subsidy law
The first explanation for a halt to convergence is the termination of the investment subsidy
law (Fördergebietsgesetz) at the end of 1996. That law offered very generous investment
grants and depreciation allowances that came close to an immediate write off. From 1997 it
was replaced with a much less generous law which no longer foresaw special depreciation
allowances and offered smaller investment grants. The termination of the investment subsidy
law clearly explains why equipment investment fell after 1996,  but it does not explain why it
fell below the western level and why the growth of per capita output  had slowed down long
before the end of 1996. Thus other explanations have to be sought.
ii) Negative cost of capital
Paradoxically, one alternative explanation may be the investment subsidy law itself. The
investment incentives imbedded in that law were so large that they actually made the cost of
capital negative for most types of investment. As reported in Sinn (1995), for a typical
investment in industrial equipment, the cost of capital was -5.1%. Thus, a project whose pre-
tax losses would have consumed 5.1 % of the invested capital per annum enjoyed sufficiently
large subsidies to compete with a normal investment in the international capital market. The
economic implication of the negative cost of capital was dramatic because capital changed
from being a factor of production to being an economic good. Hosting capital became a
service which firms offered to a well-paying government.
Firms reacted to this fundamental change of regime by operating at a point of their
production possibility frontier where they sacrificed labor productivity with regard to their
traditional output in order to make an abnormal increase in the capital intensity possible. In
the normal textbook world of economics, with positive factor prices and a free transfer of
technological knowledge, such a result would not have been possible, since firms would15
always have operated at a point of their possibility frontier where the rate of substitution of
capital for labor is negative. However, the negative price of capital drove them to a point at
the production possibility frontier where the rate of substitution was positive and where a
higher capital intensity went along with a lower level of output per employee.
















Figure 8 illustrates this result. With a normally sloped isocost line firms would choose
a point like B between A and C on the efficiency frontier. When the cost of capital is
negative, the “isocost” is positively sloped, and a solution such as D may emerge.
7 As long as
D is between C and E, where E is the point where a ray from the origin is tangent, a higher
capital intensity will be accompanied by a lower labor productivity. Thus overcapitalization
                                                
7  A range where the isoquant is positively sloped is normally not considered because the fact that the firm has
to pay for the factors of production excludes a solution in this range. Nevertheless it must exist if a solution to
the firm’s decision problem exists. In fact, the positively sloped range is the graph of a production function
where capital is an output good and labor an input good.16
can, in principle, explain why east German labor productivity remains lower than in west
Germany even when the economy is in a long-term equilibrium.
There is empirical evidence for this prediction insofar as rapid modernization has
established new structures that have reacted to the fiscal incentives. Many east German
sectors now have a higher capital intensity than their west German counterparts but suffer
nevertheless from a lower labor productivity. Table 1 reports the relevant figures for all
sectors whose capital intensity is higher than in the west. It is striking to see that the three
sectors with the highest relative capital intensity have a labor productivity of just one half or
less than that of the west.
Table 1: Relative labor productivity and capital intensity
in the capital intensive east German sectors
(as compared to the west German counterparts)
Sector Capital Intensity (%) Labor Productivity (%)
Transport equipment 108 49
Paper and paper products 110 74
Chemicals 110 59
Stone, clay and glass 111 67
Leather and leather products 117 75
Wood and wood products 119 89
Basic metals 127 51
Motor cars 155 52
Oil refineries 189 25
Source:  Gesamtwirtschaftliche und unternehmerische  Anpassungsfortschritte in  Ostdeutschland.  Neunzehnter
Bericht, DIW, IWH and IfW, IfW discussion papers 346 and 347, Kiel 1999.
Note: The figure refers to all sectors whose capital intensities are above that of the respective west German ones.
Klodt (1999) has recently argued that the low labor productivity results from an under-
utilization of capacity of east German firms. In his view, some of the excessively capital
intensive structures are “nowadays suffering from idle capacities.” This may also be an
explanation, but it has the disadvantage that it cannot easily be reconciled with the fact that
the relevant sectors all produce internationally traded commodities. Profit maximizing firms17
will fully utilize their capacities when they can sell their products to the world market.
However, when they design their plants they may divert labor away from producing ordinary
output in order to be able to “host” more capital and collect the money which the government
pays for this “service.”
iii) Dutch disease
A third explanation could be a Dutch disease type of problem. When a country has an
abundance of natural resources to sell to the rest of the world, it tends to suffer from a
revaluation of its currency and a resulting reduction in the international competitiveness of its
manufacturing sector. Resource exports crowd out commodity exports. Although east
Germany has no abundance of natural resources, it receives external funds as if it sold a
natural resource (see figure 3), and this could then, too, imply a crowding out of the
manufacturing sector. Of course, a nominal revaluation is impossible when there is one
currency, but a real revaluation could occur via an increase in the commodity prices and
wages.
Unfortunately, this argument cannot easily be reconciled with the fact that commodity
prices in east Germany have remained 10% lower than those in west Germany and that the
resource transfer seemed to follow rather than anticipate the wage increase. Nevertheless the
Dutch disease hypothesis may be useful insofar as it helps explain why the high wages are
apparently consistent with an  equilibrium of the east German economy where the output per
capita remains below the western level.
iv) Mezzogiorno
When a cause for east Germany’s problem is sought, the Mezzogiorno effect ranks highest
among the explanations. Italy’s Mezzogiorno problem arguably results from collective wage
bargaining. Due to their economic dominance it used to be the unions and employers’18
organizations of the north which fixed the wages for the whole of Italy, but wages that fitted
the north were too high for the south.
8 Unemployment and economic stagnation in southern
Italy -- the Mezzogiorno -- resulted. This phenomenon is sufficiently important to devote
another section to its analysis.
9
6. ... but wages seem to have been the dominant problem.
East Germany’s problem was very similar to that of southern Italy, since there, too, wages
were dictated from elsewhere.
10 The crucial wage negotiations took place in 1991. They fixed
the whole time path of the eastern wages relative to those in the west. At that time, however,
privatization had just started, and there were no private entrepreneurs who could have
participated in the negotiations. What happened instead was that the west German employers’
associations negotiated about the east German wages. Their negotiation partners were the
newly founded east German trade unions which were advised by the western unions. To a
large extent the negotiations were proxy negotiations, where the parties involved settled labor
conditions for others. The dominant motive in these negotiations was to avoid any risk of
endangering west German jobs, and hence the negotiating parties agreed to fully adjust the
wages in as little as five years to those in the west. Including the revaluation effect that
resulted from the 1:1 currency conversion and taking account of a 15% wage drift in west
Germany this would have meant a twelve-fold increase in the wage rate, from 7% to 85% of
the west German level.
Figure 9 shows what has happened in reality; it refers to the average hourly wage cost
in the manufacturing industry.
11 Obviously, relative wages in the east jumped from about 7%
                                                
8  As of 1999 this bargaining system has been changed so as to give the south more autonomy over the southern
wages.
9  Cf. also Boltho, Carlin, and Scaramozzino (1996) and Keller (1997).
10  See Sinn and Sinn (1991, pp. 165 -168).
11  The figure refers to average wages only. See Franz and Steiner (1999) for an extensive report on the wage
distribution.19
to 37% within the unification year. This was the revaluation effect of the currency union plus
the result of some early negotiations. Thereafter the wage rate quickly increased to 72%, a
level which it had reached as early as 1995 and has maintained thereafter. This has been
primarily the result of the negotiations.








Sources: OECD,  Main Economic Indicators  (several issues, hourly earnings in manufacturing); Federal
Statistical Office Germany, Fachserie 16, Reihe 5, (several issues, Tabelle 1.1: Index der durchschnittlichen
Bruttostundenverdienste der Arbeiter  im  Verarbeitenden Gewerbe); Economics of Transition Vol.4 (2), 1996,
table 6, p. 543 (Wages and salaries for Poland 1990-95); Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, (several issues,
external values of the Deutsche Mark); W. Breuer and D. Engels, Grundinformationen und Daten zur Sozialhilfe,
IGS Sozialforschung und Gesellschaftspolitik, Köln, 1999, p. 24 (German social assistance); Federal Statistical
Office Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch (1999 and 1994, table 21.2, net income of 4-person households with
average income).
The wage increase did not, however, continue to 85% as predicted: wages increased
ten-fold but not twelve-fold. The reason was that more and more firms left the employers’
organizations to escape the wage agreements. As of today, 85% of the firms, which employ
about 55% of the work force, have done so, and more will follow.20
The figure also shows the time paths of the manufacturing wage cost per hour in other
countries. Obviously, the east German wage cost surpassed the Irish, American and Australian
wage costs as early as 1991, and in 1993 it even became higher than the Italian level. Only the
Scandinavian and Austrian wage costs have not been matched.
The thick gray line hovering around 45% indicates the uniform  level of social aid in
Germany relative to the average west German wage income that has been available since the
time of unification (October 1990).
12 The line is important since unification included a
“Social Union” which meant that the east Germans were, among other things, entitled to the
normal west German level of social assistance. In Germany, a family’s labor income is topped
up with social assistance payments so that a certain minimum aggregate income is reached
which depends on the number of children and other family conditions. No wage contracts are
feasible which do not keep a certain distance from this minimum income, because this income
is available without any work. The wage negotiators knew this. Apart from their motive to
protect their own west German firms and jobs they had to respect the minimum wage
implicitly defined by Germany’s social assistance level, but they were not unhappy about this.
Given that wages are the most important production cost and given that labor is, next
to land, the only basic factor whose cost is determined at home, the rapid wage increase must
be seen as the major reason why the east German adjustment process has come to a halt. It
explains why the investment in equipment has been so low (and why the investment in
buildings has been so high) despite the negative cost of capital which the public subsidy
programs implied. The high wage level is a fundamental brake which had been imposed on
the east German economy right from the beginning and which many economists had
criticized.
13 Now that the driving force of the investment subsidy program is no longer
                                                
12  For a family of four.
13  See, e.g., Akerlof et al. (1991) or Sinn and Sinn (1991).21
available, it has brought the adjustment process to a halt. The east Germans simply priced
themselves out of the market.
Of course, the high wage level did not imply that the firms’ output per employee went
down. To  the contrary, the excessive increase in wages has destroyed the less productive
firms and has induced  new firms to choose a very high capital intensity of production. Both
effects have tended to increase the output per employee. This is why despite the tenfold
increase in wages unit labor costs have risen only slightly since unification and are now just
20 – 30 % higher than in west Germany. However, the rapid wage increase also explains the
dramatic fall in output after unification and the difficulties of generating a self-sustained
growth process thereafter.  It is a common wisdom nowadays that wages  are the major reason
for why output per capita in east Germany has remained so low relative to that of west
Germany.
7. The conclusions for the welfare state and the wage negotiation process
have to be drawn.
There would have been alternatives to the policy  chosen  because a market solution,  too,
would eventually have equilibrated the factor prices in the east and the west. Commodity
trade, capital movements and the migration of people would all have contributed to this result,
and the market process would, in all likelihood, have been able to chose the right speed of
convergence in the presence of adjustment and migration costs.
14  The German political
establishment, with its ignorance of economics, has not respected the laws of a market
economy but has tried to artificially anticipate the factor price equalization. This has turned
out to be a serious and expensive mistake.
                                                
14  See Sinn (1999).22
What can be done today? It is in the logic of the German solution that more money
will be poured into the east German economy to patch up the consequences of the mistakes
that have been made. It is true that the resistance to such a solution is growing in the west, in
particular since the rapid aging of the society is making it more and more difficult to continue
the policy of borrowing the funds needed to finance the transfers to the east. German public
debt has grown from 900 billion deutschmarks to 2300 billion deutschmarks within just a
decade, and Germany was therefore unable, strictly speaking, to meet the Maastricht criteria.
However, east German voters will, in all likelihood, enforce a continuation of the transfer
policy. The frequent Länder elections of 1999 have shown very clearly that the east German
electorate does not accept the policy of fiscal consolidation that the new social democratic
government has advocated. The PDS, the former communist party, has outperformed the
social democrats in most Länder with the announcement that it will fight for more transfers
and reestablish the “right” kind of socialism after the “wrong” one had failed in the GDR. The
PDS is the east German tool to blackmail the west German taxpayers. Any party advocating
reasonable economic reforms will have to fear its power.
Nevertheless, it is the task of the economist to define the necessary reforms. Arguably
they could include the following measures.
(i) A new system of social assistance
The German system of social assistance could be changed such that it will no longer result in
a lower bound on the wage distribution. This can be done by introducing something like the
American earned income tax credit; i.e., a system which subsidizes work rather than leisure
up to a certain income level. It will induce people to accept low paid jobs and reduce wages23
and create such jobs. In principle, it is compatible with better living conditions for the poor,
who would receive a market income and social assistance payments in addition.
(ii) Opt-out clauses
The German system of collective bargaining could be made more flexible by allowing single
firms to pay lower wages if both the employees and the management wish to do so. Currently,
they cannot and this inflexibility has led to a massive wave of exits from the east German
employers’ associations, as was mentioned above.
(iii) Wage asset swaps
Wage asset swaps could be used to reduce the wage cost. Management could buy the
disclaimer of productivity-driven wage increases with company shares. The shares would be
given to the insider employees in exchange for wage moderation.  “Outsiders” who are hired
after the negotiation would receive the lower wages, but no shares. Thereby wages would
effectively be differentiated between insiders and outsiders, and new jobs would be created
without insiders’ sacrifice and resistance.
(iv) Reducing the transfers
The intergovernmental transfers, which currently sum up to 140 billion a year, could
gradually be reduced to the necessary infrastructure adjustment and unavoidable social
assistance payments so as to minimize the Dutch disease effect. This includes the abolishment
of the system of investment subsidies, a re-examination of intergovernmental grants, tougher
debt limits and a reduction of east German pensions to the west German level.
The advantage of such reforms would not only be substantial savings on the part of the
west German taxpayers. They would also prepare the east German economy for the extremely
difficult period it will face from the year 2004, when the first five east European countries24
with their 63 million inhabitants will have joined the European Union. The east European
enlargement will, in all likelihood, result in a fierce low-wage competition from the new
members through commodity trade, capital outflows and a wave of mass migration. The east
German economy is Europe’s least competitive. It will have a hard time surviving between
the front-lines.25
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